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An Efficient Privacy-Preserving Outsourced
Computation over Public Data
Ximeng Liu,Member, IEEE, Baodong Qin, Robert H. Deng, Fellow, IEEE,
and Yingjiu Li, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we propose a new efficient privacy-preserving outsourced computation framework over public data, called
EPOC. EPOC allows a user to outsource the computation of a function over multi-dimensional public data to the cloud while protecting
the privacy of the function and its output. Specifically, we introduce three types of EPOC in order to tradeoff different levels of privacy
protection and performance. We present a new cryptosystem called Switchable Homomorphic Encryption with Partially Decryption
(SHED) as the core cryptographic primitive for EPOC. We introduce two coding techniques, called message pre-coding technique and
message extending and coding technique respectively, for messages encrypted under a composite order group. Furthermore, we
propose a Secure Exponent Calculation Protocol with Public Base (SEPB), which serves as the core sub-protocol in EPOC. Detailed
security analysis shows that the proposed EPOC achieves the goal of outsourcing computation of a private function over public data
without privacy leakage to unauthorized parties. In addition, performance evaluations via extensive simulations demonstrate that
EPOC is efficient in both computation and communications.
Index Terms—Data privacy, encryption, outsourced computation, function privacy
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
CLOUD computing are gaining momentum in many areassuch as Internet of Things (IoT) [1], e-commerce [2], and
scientific research [3], [4]. Hybrid cloud is a cloud computing
environment which uses a mix of on-premises, private and
public clouds to perform distinct functions within an organi-
zation. By balancing the use of internal assets and external
services, hybrid cloud has drawn much attention not only
from the industry, but also from the academic. For example,
Microsoft’s hybrid cloud [5] aims to take advantage of stor-
age, backup, and recovery options with increased efficiency
and reduced cost.MITMedia Lab [6] explores the use of cloud
and hybrid cloud to enjoy suchuse benefits as IT speed, agility
and robust, and three-tier disaster recovery (DR).
Huge amount of data stored in the public cloud, such as
news, twitters, maps and genomes, are publicly accessible.
One of the most commonly used type of publicly accessible
data is called the multi-dimensional public data and its ana-
lytics requires data processing across multiple dimensions
and is receiving tremendous attention in the business world
today. For example, let us consider a stock brokerage firm
which selects preferred stocks or bonds for its clients based on
a proprietary prediction function with multi-dimensional
inputs. Computation of the prediction function is time-
consuming and hence is outsourced to the cloud, where
servers gather data from various stock markets as input, eval-
uate the function, and return the results to the firm. Based on
the results of the computation, the firm provides recommen-
dations of financial securities to its clients. Although out-
sourcing computation of functions can certainly benefit users
who have limited storage and computational capabilities, its
flourish still hinges on understanding and managing its flexi-
bility, data security and privacy challenges. In the brokerage
firm example, as the prediction function is proprietary to the
firm, without appropriate privacy protection, the firm would
be very reluctant to delegate the computation of the function
to cloud service providers. Furthermore, the results of the
functional computation contains valuable and sensitive infor-
mation, and transmitting such data without adequate protec-
tion is clearly not in the interest of the firm and its clients. In
short, both the firm’s function and its output must be
protected throughout the entire outsourcing process.
In this paper, to address the above-mentioned privacy
issue in outsourcing functional computation over public
multi-dimensional dataset, we propose an Efficient Privacy-
preserving Outsourced Computation Framework over Pub-
lic Data, called EPOC, which protects privacy of both the
function and its output. Specifically, the main contributions
of this paper are fourfold.
 Wepropose a generic EPOC frameworkwhich allows
privacy-preserving outsourced computation over
publicly accessible multi-dimensional data according
to a function defined by user. With EPOC, user’s pri-
vate function and the final computed results will not
be leaked to other parties. Three concrete construc-
tions of EPOC, called basic EPOC, enhanced EPOC,
and full EPOC, are proposed in order to balance secu-
rity and performance.
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 As the core cryptographic primitive of realizing
EPOC, we present a new cryptosystem called
Switchable Homomorphic Encryption with Par-
tially Decryption (SHED). In SHED, an additive
homomorphic ciphertext is transformed into a
multiplicative homomorphic ciphertext and the
additive homomorphic private key can be ran-
domly separated into two shares for distributively
decryption.
 SHED is constructed over a composite group. We
introduce two coding methods, called Message Pre-
coding Technique (MPT), and Message Extending
and Coding technique (MEC), respectively, for con-
verting messages into the input domain of SHED.
We also present a Secure Exponent Calculation Pro-
tocol with Public Base (SEPB) for securely comput-
ing exponential functions with public base and
encrypted exponent.
 To assess performance of the proposed EPOC, we
develop a custom simulator in Java. Extensive simu-
lation results show that our EPOC is efficient in both
computation and communications.
Applications. Our EPOC framework can protect user’s
computation privacy and its final results with public
input which contains multitudinous applications, for
example, the National Center for Health Statistics
(NCHS) provide public-use data [7] in the cloud server. A
commercial company can compute a function (e.g., a pre-
diction model) over the public dataset in order to obtain
forecast on-the-fly while without compromising the pri-
vacy of computation and the final results. Moreover, our
EPOC framework focuses on protecting computational
privacy of outsourced polynomial functions. Polynomial
functions [8] are considered as one of the most important
kernel in Support Vector Machines (SVMs), which find
numerous applications, such as prediction of foreign cur-
rency exchange rates [9], prediction of bankruptcy [10],
and protein sub-cellular localization [11]. Protecting poly-
nomial function is the key to protect polynomial kernel
SVM. The protected model can be used for privacy-pre-
serving classification and prediction.
2 PRELIMINARY
In this section, we review partially homomorphic cryptosys-
tems and switchable homomorphic encryption in the litera-
ture, which will serve as the basis of the proposed EPOC.
For ease of reference, Table 1 lists the main notations used
throughout the paper.
2.1 Partially Homomorphic Cryptosystems
Partially homomorphic cryptosystems can be categorized
into additive homomorphic (ADD) cryptosystems and mul-
tiplicative homomorphic (MUL) cryptosystems. Suppose
Epkþðm1Þ and Epkþðm2Þ are two additive homomorphic
ciphertexts under the same ADD public key pkþ, additive
homomorphic cryptosystems has the additive homomor-
phism property:
DskþðEpkþðm1Þ  Epkþðm2ÞÞ ¼ m1 þm2:
Suppose Epkðm1Þ and Epkðm2Þ are two multiplicative
homomorphic ciphertexts under the same MUL public key
pk, multiplicative homomorphic cryptosystems has the
multiplicative homomorphism property:
DskðEpkðm1Þ  Epkðm2ÞÞ ¼ m1m2:
2.2 Switchable Homomorphic Encryption
The notion of Switchable Homomorphic Encryption (SHE)
is proposed in [12] which allows a server and a proxy to
transform multiplicative homomorphic ciphertext into
additive homomorphic ciphertext. The SHE scheme works
as follows:
KeyGen: Given a security parameter k and two large
prime numbers p; q, where p ¼ 2p0 þ 1 and q ¼ 2q0 þ 1,
jpj ¼ jqj ¼ k, compute N ¼ pq and  ¼ lcmðp 1; q  1Þ=2.
Define a function LðxÞ ¼ x1N , choose a generator g, such that
the order of g is 2p0q0. Then choose two random odd num-
bers u1, u2 2 ZN , where ju1j  ju2j < 12 jNj. Set u ¼ u1u2, cal-
culate h ¼ gu modN , and output the following public-
private key pairs:
fpkþ; skþg :¼ fN ; ð; p; qÞg; fpk; skg :¼ fðN; g; hÞ; ug:
AddEnc: The algorithm takes as input an ADD public key
pkþ ¼ N and a message m 2 ZN It chooses a random
r0 2 ZN and outputs the ADD ciphertext as
EpkþðmÞ ¼ ð1þNÞm  r0N modN2:
AddDec: An ADD ciphertext EpkþðmÞ can be decrypted
using the ADD private key skþ ¼  by first calculating,
T1 ¼ EpkþðmÞ modN2 ¼ r0Nð1þmNÞ modN2
¼ ð1þmNÞ:
Then, due to gcdð;NÞ ¼ 1,1m can be recovered as:
LðT1 modN2Þ1 modN ¼ m:
TABLE 1
Definitions and Notations in EPOC
Symbol Definition
pkþ, skþ Additive homomorphic (ADD) public & private
key
pk; sk Multiplicative homomorphic (MUL) public &
private key
EpkþðÞ ADD encryption algorithm with ADD public key
EpkðÞ MUL encryption algorithm with MUL public key
ðajpÞ Legendre symbol (odd prime p and an integer a)
ðajnÞ Jacobi symbol (two integer a and n)
F ;F0;F00 The outsourced function
~C A plaintext vector ~C ¼ ðC1; . . . ; CnÞ
~C
Eþ An ADD encrypted vector ~C
Eþ ¼ ðEpkþðC1Þ; . . . ;
EpkþðCnÞÞ
~C
E AMUL encrypted vector ~C
E ¼ ðEpkðC1Þ; . . . ;
EpkðCnÞÞ
a  b Multiplication between a and b over cyclic group
1. gcdðx; yÞ is greatest common divisor between x and y.
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MulEnc: The algorithm takes as input a MUL public key
pk ¼ ðN; g; hÞ and a message m 2 ZN , such that the Jacobi
symbol of m is 1. It chooses a random r 2 Z2p0q0 and outputs
the MUL ciphertext2 as
EpkðmÞ ¼ fC1; C2g ¼ fm  hrmodN; grmodNg:
MulDec: The MUL ciphertext EpkðmÞ can be decrypted
using the MUL private key sk ¼ u by calculating:
C1=C
u
2 ¼ m  hr=ðgrÞu ¼ m:
AddToMix: This algorithm is run locally by the server. Given
a ADD ciphertext EpkþðmÞ and MUL public key pk. It
chooses a random r 2 Z2p0q0 and outputs the ciphertext as:
Epkþ;pkðmÞ ¼ fð1þNÞmh
r  r0N modN2; grmodNg:
MixToAdd: This algorithm is jointly run by the server and
the proxy. Given a mixed ciphertext Epkþ;pkðmÞ ¼ fT1; T2g,
the server chooses a random number s 2 Z2p0q0 , and com-
pute c1 ¼ ðT2  gsÞu1 ¼ gðrþsÞu1 modN and c2 ¼ gsmodN , then
sends fT1; c1; c2g to proxy.
Once received fT1; c1; c2g, the proxy computes
ðc1Þu2 ¼ hrþs and its inverse ðhrþsÞ1 modN . Then, it com-
putes
T 01 ¼ T1ðh
rþsÞ1 modN2 ¼ EpkþðmhsÞ: (1)
and c02 ¼ ðc2Þu2 ¼ gsu2 modN , and sends fT 01; c02g to the
server.
The server uses fT 01; c02g to compute ðc02Þu1 ¼ hsmodN .
Then, the ADD ciphertext can be recovered by calculating
ðT 01Þh
s ¼ Epkþðmhs  hsÞ ¼ EpkþðmÞ:
3 SYSTEM & PRIVACY MODELS
In this section, we formalize the EPOC system and privacy
models.
3.1 System Model
Our system consists of four types of generic entities: Trusted
Authority (TA), User, Public Cloud Platform (PCP) and Pri-
vate Computation Cloud (PCC)—see Fig. 1.
3.1.1 Trusted Authority (TA)
TA is assumed to be trusted by all the other entities to dis-
tribute and manage all the private & public keys in the
system.
3.1.2 User
The goal of a user is to get computed results over public
database according to a function of his choice. The user
sends a query to PCP, specifying the function in a privacy-
preserving manner. The PCP computes the results and
returns them back to the user. Note that the results can only
be decrypted with the help of PCC, i.e., the user cannot get
the finally results without the authorization of PCC.
3.1.3 Private Computation Cloud
PCC provides computation service to the user, e.g., it can
process encrypted data such as multiplication over the
encrypted data. Also, PCC has the ability to partially
decrypt ciphertexts which are sent from PCP, do some cal-
culations over the plaintexts, and then re-encrypt the data
with corresponding user’s public key.
3.1.4 Public Cloud Platform
PCP contains unlimited data storage space which stores and
manages all the public data. PCP stores all the intermediate
and final results in encrypted form. Furthermore, PCP has
some computation power to perform certain calculations
over encrypted data.
Next, we present the dataset and the function used in our
EPOC. Suppose a data space D defined by a set of g dimen-
sions fx1; . . . ; xgg and a dataset S on D with cardinality g. A
transaction ~ai 2 S can be represented as ~ai ¼ ðai;1; . . . ; ai;gÞ,
where ai;k 2 G2p0q0 is a value on dimension dk ði ¼ 1; . . . ;
t; k ¼ 1; . . . ; gÞ. All the transactions are stored as plaintext
form in PCP and the dataset S can be accessed by any party
in the system (include the adversary A defined in 3.2). A
user a’s goal is to obtain the output of the function
F : o ¼
Xk
j¼1
Cjx
tj;1
1 . . .xg
tj;g ;3
over the public data stored in PCP, where Cj 2 G2p0q0 and
tj;k 2 ZN . This kind of functions can be used for statistical
analysis. For example, the user can calculate the arithmetic
mean x ¼ ðPgi¼1 xiÞ=g across different dimensions. The
standard deviation s ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
g
Pg
i ðxi  xÞ2
q
can also be calcu-
lated (note that X ¼ 1
g
Pg
i ðxi  xÞ2, a special case of F , can
Fig. 1. System model under consideration.
2. As we choose composite order of ElGamal encryption, the cipher-
text will leak the Jacobi symbol of m. To solve the problem, we only
encryptmwith Jacobi symbol 1.
3. All the functions used in EPOC are defined over ring of integers
Z, thus the function must satisfy the following restriction: 1) the size of
output of the function must less thanN , i.e. joj < N . 2) the size of every
monomials must lessN , i.e. jCjxtj;11 . . . x
tj;g
g j < N for every j.
If the function is defined over ZN , the function which used in EPOC
has no restriction, i.e., the function is formalized as
F : o ¼
Xk
j¼1
Cjx
tj;1
1 . . . x
tj;g
g modN:
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be computed on server side, the user can calculate
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X
p
by
himself to get the standard deviation). Moreover, for poly-
nomial kernel SVM classification, the classifier is to map
the data from the input space X to a feature space F . In
the space F , the discriminant function is fðxÞ ¼ Pni¼1
kðx; xiÞ þ b, where kðx; x0Þ ¼ ðxTx0 þ 1Þd is a degree-d polyno-
mial kernel.
3.2 Privacy Model
In our privacy model, PCP and PCC are curious-but-honest
parties in that they strictly follow the protocol, but are inter-
ested in user’s private information, e.g., both PCP and PCC
are curious about user’s private outsourced function and
calculated results. EPOC should meet the following privacy
requirements.
 User Privacy: protect privacy of user’s function and
the output of the function from PCP, PCC and any
external adversary. That is, PCP, PCC and any exter-
nal adversary cannot learn anything about user’s
function in the query as well as anything about the
output of the function.
 Privilege Separation: It can prevent the user to the
abuse of privilege without the permission of the
PCC and allow PCC to efficiently revoke the user’s
private key.
 Security of Data-in-transit: guarantee confidentiality
of data during transmission.
To satisfy these privacy requirements, we assume that
there exist an active adversary A in our system. The goal of
A is to compromise user’s privacy4 with the following
attacking abilities: A may eavesdrop on all the communica-
tion links to get the challenge user’s encrypted queries,
encrypted middle results and encrypted final results. Also,
A may compromise PCP, PCC, and users simultaneously,
but subject to the following restrictions: 1) A cannot com-
promise PCP and PCC at the same time. 2) A cannot com-
promise the challenge user.
For efficiency concern, we achieve the aforementioned
privacy requirements by defining the following three pri-
vacy levels.
Definition 1 (Level-I Privacy). Upon completion of an EPOC
protocol, A cannot learn the coefficients Cjðj ¼ 1; . . . ; kÞ of
the outsourced function F and the final outputs.
Definition 2 (Level-II Privacy). Upon completion of an EPOC
protocol, A cannot learn the coefficients Cjðj ¼ 1; . . . ; kÞ and
degrees tj;1 . . . ; tj;g of the outsourced function F and the final
outputs.
Definition 3 (Level-III Privacy). Upon completion of an EPOC
protocol, A cannot learn the coefficients Cjðj ¼ 1; . . . ; kÞ,
degrees tj;1 . . . ; tj;g , the size k, and the format of the outsourced
function F and the final outputs.
Note that both the PCC and PCP can know which
dimensions in the dataset S have been used for
outsourced function calculation in the level-I and level-II
privacy. This kind of information is fully protected in
level-III privacy EPOC, i.e., PCC and PCP cannot know
which data in S are used for calculation (see Section 4.5
for detailed construction).
4 PROPOSED EPOC FRAMEWORK
In this section, we will mainly introduce three versions of
EPOC, called basic EPOC, enhanced EPOC, and full EPOC,
respectively, to achieve different privacy levels defined in
Section 3.2.
4.1 Switchable Homomorphic Encryption with
Partially Decryption
In order to realize EPOC, we design a new cryptosystem
called Switchable Homomorphic Encryption with Partially
Decryption based on Switchable Homomorphic Encryption
(SHE) [12]. The AddEnc, AddDec, MulEnc, MulDec, Add-
ToMix, MixToAdd of SHED is the same as the correspond-
ing algorithm in SHE. The SHED works as follows:
KeyGen: Given the security parameter k, choose two large
safe prime numbers p0; q0, compute p ¼ 2p0 þ 1 and
q ¼ 2q0 þ 1, such that p  1mod 8 and q  1mod 8,
where jpj ¼ jqj ¼ k. Then, compute N ¼ pq and  ¼ lcmðp
1; q  1Þ=2. Define a function LðxÞ ¼ x1N , choose a generator
g, s.t., the order of g is 2p0q0, then choose two random
odd numbers u1, u2 2 ZðN1Þ=2.5 It sets u ¼ u1u2 and calculate
h ¼ gu modN ,. randomly separated  into two parts and
denote the partial ADD private key as 1 and 2, s.t.,
1 þ 2  0mod and 1 þ 2  1mod N2 hold at the same
time (the selection of p; q and the existence of the partial ADD
private key splitting can be found in Section 5.1). The algo-
rithm output the following ADD and MUL public-private
key pairs:
fpkþ; skþg :¼ fN ; ð1; 2; p; qÞg;
fpk; skg :¼ fðN; g; hÞ; ðu1; u2Þg:
The 1 and u1 are given to server while 2 and u2 are given to
proxy.
MulToMix: This algorithm is run locally by the server.
Given a MUL ciphertext EpkðmÞ ¼ fm  hr; grmodNg and
public key pkþ and pk, choose a random r1 2 Z2p0q0 to re-
randomize the MUL ciphertext as EpkðmÞ ¼ fm  hr00 ;
gr
00
modNg, where r00 ¼ rþ r1. Then, choose a random
r0 2 Z2p0q0 and output the mixed ciphertext as:
Epkþ;pkðmÞ ¼ fð1þNÞmh
r00  r0N modN2; gr00 modNg:
AddPDec1: Upon receiving the ADD ciphertext EpkþðmÞ,
uses the partial ADD private key 1 to generate the partially
decrypted ciphertext EpkþðmÞ as:
CT ðmÞ ¼ ðEpkþðmÞÞ1 ¼ r0N1ð1þmN1ÞmodN2:
4. Before attacking a user, the adversary A should issue a target
and try to guess the plaintext value of the target user’s ciphertext with
some existing resources. We call the target user as the challenge user.
5. From [13], the distribution of a uniform random variable over
ZðN1Þ=2 is statistically indistinguishable from the one over Z2p0q0 .
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AddPDec2: Upon receiving both the original ciphertext
EpkþðmÞ and the partially decrypted ciphertext CT ðmÞ,
recover the original message by using the partial ADD pri-
vate key 2:
T 00 ¼ CT ðmÞ  ðEpkþðmÞÞ2
¼ r0Nð1þ2Þð1þmNð1 þ 2ÞÞ modN2:
Then calculate LðT 00Þ ¼ m to recoverm.
4.2 Key Distribution in EPOC
Before executing EPOC, TA should generate all the private
keys and distribute them to the corresponding parties. Sup-
pose there are one PCC, one PCP and b users involved in
the EPOC.
TA firstly runs KeyGen algorithm to generate b ADD
public key pkþi ¼ Ni and corresponding ADD private key
skþi :¼ ði;1; i;2; pi; qiÞði ¼ 1; . . . ;bÞ, and MUL private keys
ski ¼ uimodNi under Ni. TA uses ui to generate
hi ¼ gui modNi for each i ¼ 1; . . . ;b, and denotes the ski ’s
corresponding public key as pki ¼ ðNi; gi; hiÞ. The ADD
and MUL public key pair ðpkþi ; pki Þi¼1;...;b are sent to the
corresponding user i. Furthermore, the ui are needed to gen-
erate partial MUL private keys ðui;1; ui;2Þ and ui;1 should be
sent to PCP while ui;2 should be sent to PCC for storage
respectively. The partial ADD private key i;1 are send to
PCC while i;2 are sent to the user i for storage respectively.
Notice that no party in the system holds skþi and sk

i , which
guarantee no one can directly decrypt encrypted results.
Furthermore, pkþi is sent to PCP while pk

i ði ¼ 1; . . . ;bÞ are
sent to PCC for storage. After distributing all the private
keys, EPOC will be executed. Next, we gives detailed con-
struction of EPOC in different privacy levels.
4.3 Basic EPOC for Achieving Level-I Privacy
In our basic EPOC, the outsourced function’s coefficients
are stored as encrypted form. Once a user a want to retrieve
some data from the dataset, both the encrypted coefficients
Epkþa ðCiÞ and function’s patten x
tj;1
1 . . .x
tj;g
g ðj ¼ 1; . . . ; kÞ
should be outsourced to PCP.
1. Secure monomials calculation stage (Stage One). In this
stage, PCP needs to calculate the monomials over
the public dataset which is formalized as Cjx
tj;1
1 . . .
x
tj;g
g . As all the data ~ai ¼ ðai;1; . . . ; ai;gÞ are stored in
plaintext form in PCP, a
tj;1
i;1 . . . a
tj;g
i;g ði ¼ 1; . . . ; t; j ¼
1; . . . ; kÞ can be calculated by PCP according to the
function’s patten x
tj;1
1 . . .x
tj;g
g . Then, the function’s
monomials can be easily calculated as:
Epkþa ðCjÞ
a
tj;1
i;1
...a
tj;g
i;g ¼ Epkþa ðCja
tj;1
i;1 . . . a
tj;g
i;g Þ;
which is stored for further processing.
2. Secure outsourced function calculation stage (Stage Two).
Once the secure monomials calculation phase is
finished, PCP needs to use Epkþa ðCja
tj;1
i;1 . . . a
tj;g
i;g Þ to
compute the final encrypted results Epkþa ðoiÞ for
every i according to the outsourced function F .
Due to the additive homomorphism property of
SHED, additive operation over the plaintext can be
easily achieved by multiplication of the ciphertext
as follows:
Epkþa ðoiÞ ¼ Epkþa
Xk
j¼1
Cja
tj;1
i;1 . . . a
tj;g
i;g
 !
¼
Yk
j¼1
Epkþa ðCja
tj;1
i;1 . . . a
tj;g
i;g Þ:
After that, all the encrypted results Epkþa ðoiÞ need to be
decrypted by user a. Firstly, all the Epkþa ðoiÞ are send to PCC
and are partially decrypted by calling AddPDec1 with a;1.
Then, these partially decrypted ciphertexts are sent to the
user a and are decrypted to get the results oiði ¼ 1; . . . ; tÞ by
calling AddPDec2 with user a’s partially private key a;2.
That is, the user can only decrypt the final results with the
help of PCC.
In the basic EPOC, only the coefficients of the outsourced
function are protected. If the user requires a better protec-
tion, i.e., to protect not only the coefficients of the function,
but also the exponent of every monomials in the outsourced
function, the enhanced EPOC will be presented below
should be used.
4.4 Enhanced EPOC for Achieving Level-II Privacy
In order to protect coefficient Cj and the exponent of mono-
mials tj;k at the same time, the user should encrypt all these
querieswith pka and send them to PCP.However, there exist
two main problems which need to be solved. 1) Because all
theMUL ciphertext is computed overN , the message should
be chosen over the sub-group 2p0q0 to guarantee the security
of MUL ciphertext, i.e., the plaintext must be chosen such
that its Jacobi symbol is 1. Thus, as tj;k are encrypted using
MulEnc with pka , the plaintext must satisfy that its Jacobi
symbol is 1 and the message is not equal to 0. 2) to securely
compute the outsourced function, the PCP must compute
the monomials formalized as Cjx
tj;1
1 . . .x
tj;g
g . As tj;k is stored
in encrypted form, it is impossible for PCP to directly com-
puteEpka ðx
tj;k
k Þ usingMUL ciphertext.
In order to solve these two problems, we first present a
technique called message pre-coding to solve the MUL
encryption problem, and then present a protocol called
Secure Exponent Calculation Protocol with Public Base to
solve the secure exponent calculation problem. Finally, we
use the SEPB to construct the enhanced EPOC.
4.4.1 Message Pre-Coding Technique
The exponent tj;k are arbitrary positive integer number, how-
ever, the plaintext in theMUL ciphertext can only have Jacobi
symbol 1 andmust not equal to 0, as discussed above. In order
to successful design the EPOC system, Message Pre-coding
Technique is adopted to transform all the non-zero data into
the message with Jacobi symbol 1. Notice that the Legendre
symbol ð1jpÞ ¼ ð1Þðp1Þ=2 ¼ 1, ð1jqÞ ¼ ð1Þðq1Þ=2 ¼1,
ð1jpÞ ¼ 1, and ð1jqÞ ¼ 1, the Jacobi symbol ð1jNÞ ¼
ð1jpqÞ ¼ ð1jpÞð1jqÞ ¼ 1 and ð1jNÞ ¼ ð1jpqÞ ¼ ð1jpÞð1jqÞ ¼ 1.
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We first show that the Jacobi symbol ð2jNÞ ¼ 1. As p0; q0
are two safe primes, p ¼ 2p0 þ 1 and p  1mod 8, and
q ¼ 2q0 þ 1 and q  1mod 8. The Legendre symbol ð2jpÞ ¼
ð1Þðp21Þ=8 ¼ 1 and ð2jqÞ ¼ ð1Þðq21Þ=8 ¼ 1. As p and q are
primes, the Jacobi symbol ð2jNÞ ¼ ð2jpqÞ ¼ ð2jpÞð2jqÞ ¼ 1.
So the Jacobi symbol ð2kjNÞ ¼Qkð2jNÞ ¼ 1:
Next, we show that given an arbitrary positive integer A,
it can be pre-coding as the following form:
A ¼ 2k
Xf1
i¼0
bi2
i;
where bi ¼ fþ1;1g, k is the largest non-negative integer so
that 2kjA. For xA, it can be represented as
xA ¼
Yf1
i¼0
xbi2
kþi ¼ xtf . . .xt1 ;
where tiþ1 ¼ bi2kþi. Notice that ðtiþ1jNÞ ¼ ðbi2kþijNÞ ¼
ðbijNÞð2kþijNÞ ¼ ðbijNÞ
Q
kþið2jNÞ ¼ 1.
Algorithm 1.MESSAGE PRE-CODING TECHNIQUE
Input: Positive integer number A and large numberN .
Output: Vector ðtf; . . . ; t1Þ, such that for each ti, ðtijNÞ ¼ 1.
1 The number A should be first converted into binary number,
such that A ¼Pj ai2j.;
2 Extract 2k from A, denote as A ¼ 2kB, such that B is odd inte-
ger number, k is the largest non-negative integer.;
3 Denote B ¼Pci¼0 b0i2i. If c < f, f c 1 elements should be
added into B, such that B0 ¼Pfi¼0 b00i 2i, when i 	 c, b00i ¼ b0i;
when c < i 	 f, b00i ¼ 0.;
4 for i 0 to f 1 do
5 if b00i ¼ 1 and b00iþ1 ¼ 0 then
6 let bi ¼ 1 and biþ1 ¼ 1.
7 if b00i ¼ 1 and b00iþ1 ¼ 1 then
8 let bi ¼ 1 and biþ1 ¼ 1.
9 generate ðtf; . . . ; t1Þ, where tiþ1 ¼ bi2kþi ð0 	 i 	 f 1Þ.
The Jacobi symbol of ti is equal to ðtiþ1jNÞ
¼ ðbi2kþiÞ ¼ðbijNÞð2kþijNÞ ¼ ðbijNÞð2kþijNÞ ¼ 1. Therefore,
an arbitrary integer A can be can transformed into
ðtf; . . . ; t1Þ, where ðtijNÞ ¼ 1. The construction can be found
in Algorithm 1.
Example 1. We use an example to illustrate our Message
Pre-coding Technique. Let p0 ¼ 3 and q0 ¼ 11 and f ¼ 3,
compute p ¼ 2p0 þ 1 ¼ 7 and q ¼ 2q0 þ 1 ¼ 23. It can be
easily verified that pmod8 ¼ q mod 8 ¼ 1. The Legen-
dre symbol ð3jpÞ ¼ 1 and ð3jqÞ ¼ 1. Suppose there exists
two integers A ¼ 6 and B ¼ 2, the Jacobi symbol
ðAjNÞ ¼ ð3jNÞð2jNÞ ¼ 1 and ðBjNÞ ¼ 1. The integer A
can be represented as A ¼ 21 P2i¼0 ai2i, where ða2; a1;
a0Þ ¼ ð1;1; 1Þ. The integer B can be represented as
B ¼ 20 P2i¼0 bi2i, where ðb2; b1; b0Þ ¼ ð1;1;1Þ.
4.4.2 Secure Exponent Calculation Protocol
with Public Base
The SEPB protocol involves two parties, PCP and PCC. Con-
sider PCP holds a public base x, an encrypted exponent
Epka ðyÞ and a partial MUL private key ua;1. PCC contains a
partial MUL private key ua;2 and public key pk

a . The goal of
SEPB protocol is to calculate Epka ðxyÞ without leaking y to
PCC. The overall steps of SEPB protocol are shown as follows:
Step 1: PCP selects two random numbers R1; R2 2 Z2p0q0
with Jacobi symbol of 1, s.t., gcdðR1; R2Þ ¼ 1, calculatesX1 ¼
Epka ðyÞ  Epka ðR1Þ ¼ fyR1hr1þr
0
1 modN; gr1þr
0
1 modNg and
X2 ¼ Epka ðyÞ  Epka ðR2Þ ¼ fyR2hr2þr
0
2 modN; gr2þr
0
2 modNg.
Then, calculates C1 ¼ ðgr1þr01Þua;1 , C2 ¼ ðgr2þr02Þua;1 , and sends
X01 ¼ fyR1hr1þr
0
1 ; C1g,X02 ¼ fyR2hr2þr
0
2 ; C2g and x to PCC.
Step 2: PCC firstly calculates C01 ¼ C
ua;2
1 ¼ hr1þr
0
1 modN
and C02 ¼ C
ua;2
2 ¼ hr2þr
0
2 modN , computes T1 ¼ yR1hr1þr01=
C01 modN ¼ yR1, T2 ¼ yR2hr2þr
0
2=C02 modN ¼ yR2, and
h1 ¼ xT1 and h2 ¼ xT2 . Then, PCC encrypts h1 and h2 by
using pka and denotes it as H1 ¼ Epka ðh1Þ ¼ fxyR1hr
00
1 modN;
gr
00
1 modNg and H2 ¼ Epka ðh2Þ ¼ fxyR2hr
00
2 modN; gr
00
2 modNg,
and sendsH1 andH2 to PCP.
Step 3: Since gcdðR1; R2Þ ¼ 1, there exists integers a; b, s.t,
aR1 þ bR2 ¼ 1. OnceH1 andH2 are received, PCP can calcu-
late the following formula to gain the encrypted xy:
H1
a H2b ¼ fxyR1ahr001a  xyR2bhr002b; gr001a  gr002bg;
¼ Epka ðxyR1a  xyR2bÞ ¼ Epka ðxyÞ:
4.4.3 Construction of Enhanced EPOC
In our enhanced EPOC, only the needed coefficients and
exponents are encrypted with MUL public key, i.e., no zero
elements are needed to encrypt under the MulEnc algo-
rithm. Notice that theMulEnc can only encrypt the message
with the Jacobi symbol of 1 in order to guarantee the secu-
rity of the ciphertext. Before encryption, all exponent of
every monomials tj;k should be transformed into the t
0
j;k;l
(l ¼ 1; . . . ;f) with Jacobi symbol of 1 by using message pre-
coding technique. The value of all the coefficient in function
F should be selected by user, such that the Jacobi symbol of
Cj (j ¼ 1; . . . ; K) is 1.
After transformation, the outsourced function F used in
basic EPOC should be transformed into the new function
F0 : o ¼
Xk
j¼1
Cj
Yg
k¼1
Yf
l¼1
x
t0
j;k;f
k
 !
:
Once the encrypted user a’s queries Epka ðCjÞ and Epka ðt0j;k;lÞðj ¼ 1; . . . ; k; k ¼ 1; . . . ; g; l ¼ 1; . . . ;fÞ are received, PCP
needs to use all these queries in conjunction with the public
dataset S to compute the results privately according to the
user’s outsourced function F . The calculation can be
described as following stages:
1. Secure monomials calculation stage (Stage One). In this
stage, PCP needs to calculate the monomials over
the public dataset which formalized as Cj 
Qg
k¼1
x
t0
j;k;1
k . . .x
t0
j;k;f
k . As all the t
0
j;k;1; . . . ; t
0
j;k;f are stored as
encrypted form, the monomials cannot be computed
directly. For every i; j; k; l ði ¼ 1; . . . ; t; j ¼ 1; . . . ; k;
k ¼ 1; . . . ; g; l ¼ 1; . . . ;fÞ, PCP first computes
Epka ða
t0
j;k;l
i;k Þ by calling:
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Epka a
t0
j;k;l
i;k
 
¼ SEPBðai;k; Epka ðt0j;k;lÞÞ: (2)
Then, PCP uses Epka ðCjÞ and Epka ða
t0
j;k;l
i;k Þðl ¼
1; . . . ;fÞ to calculate
Epka Cj 
Yg
k¼1
a
t0
j;k;1
i;k . . . a
t0
j;k;f
i;k
 !
¼ Epka ðCjÞ 
Yg
k¼1
Yf
l¼1
Epka ða
tj;k
i;k Þ:
and the results can be used for further processing.
2. Secure outsourced function calculation stage (Stage Two).
Once the secure monomials calculation phase is fin-
ished, PCP needs to use Epka ðCj
Qg
k¼1 a
t0
j;k;1
i;k . . . a
t0
j;k;f
i;k Þ
to compute the final encrypted results Epkþa ðoiÞ for
every iði ¼ 1; . . . ; tÞ according to the outsourced
function F . Firstly, Epka ðCj
Qg
k¼1 a
t0
j;k;1
i;k . . . a
t0
j;k;f
i;k Þ should
be transferred into Epkþa ðCj
Qg
k¼1 a
t0
j;k;1
i;k . . . a
t0
j;k;f
i;k Þ by
calling MulToMix and MixToAdd of the SHED.
After that, additive operation over the plaintexts can
be easily achieved by multiplication of the ADD
ciphertexts as follows:
Epkþa ðoiÞ ¼ Epkþa
Xk
j¼1
Cj
Yg
k¼1
a
t0
j;k;1
i;k . . . a
t0
j;k;f
i;k
 !
¼
Yk
j¼1
Epkþa ðCj
Yg
k¼1
a
t0
j;k;1
i;k . . . a
t0
j;k;f
i;k Þ:
After that, the user a can decrypt the results oi same pro-
cedure as basic EPOC.
4.5 Full EPOC for Achieving Level-III Privacy
In the enhanced EPOC, only the needed dimension are
involved in the calculation. Indeed, it will expose the adver-
sary A some extra information about which dimension is
used in the function. Moreover, the number of monomials in
the function also expose some extra information. In our full
EPOC, all the dimension should be used in the function. If
the user does not need the dimension in the function, he sim-
ply denote the value of exponent of redundancy dimension
as 0. Furthermore, some redundancy monomials should be
added to the original function F , and these redundancy
monomials should not change the output value of the origi-
nal function F . The goal of the function transformation is to
avoidA to guess howmanymonomials contained inF .
In order to expose nothing about the outsourced functions
(even the patten of the function), full PPOC should be
designed in this section. Before executing the full EPOC,
some redundancy monomials should be added in the func-
tion. The function used in full EPOC contains fix K mono-
mials, i.e., K  k redundancy monomials are added to the
original function F . The goal of the function transformation
is to avoid adversary to guess how many monomials
contained in the original outsourced function. Moreover, as
our SHED cannot encrypt message “0” under pka , all the
coefficient of the redundancymonomials should be (Cj ¼ þ1
andCjþ1 ¼ 1) or (Cj ¼ 1,Cjþ1 ¼ 1 andCjþ2 ¼ 2).
In full EPOC, all the dimensions will be involved in the
calculation, and the value of exponent of redundancy
dimension should be 0. It prevents PCC and PCP to know
how many dimensions are used in each monomials. As
SHED cannot encrypt message ‘0’ under pka , a new tech-
nique called Message Extending and Coding Technique are
proposed in Algorithm 2 to solve this problem.
Algorithm 2.MESSAGE EXTENDING AND CODING TECHNIQUE
Input: Integer number A and large numberN .
Output: Vector ðtf; . . . ; t1Þ and ðt0f; . . . ; t01Þ, such that for each
ti and t
0
i, ðtijNÞ ¼ 1 and ðt0ijNÞ ¼ 1
1 The number A should be converted into two number A1 and
A2, such that: if A 6¼ 1, then A1 ¼ A 1 and A2 ¼ 1; if A ¼ 1,
then A1 ¼ Aþ 1 ¼ 2 and A2 ¼ 1.;
2 if A1 ¼ 1 then
3 coding A1 as ðdf; . . . ; d1Þ such that df ¼ 2f1,
djþ1 ¼ 2jð0 	 j 	 f 1Þ.
4 else
5 coding A1 as ðdf; . . . ; d1Þ using message pre-coding
technique.
6 if A2 ¼ 1 then
7 coding A2 as ðd0f; . . . ; d01Þ such that d0f ¼ 2f1,
d0jþ1 ¼ 2jð0 	 j 	 f 1Þ.
8 else
9 coding A2 as ðd0f; . . . ; d01Þ using message pre-coding
technique.
Before the MulEnc encryption, all exponent of mono-
mials tj;k should be transformed into the ðdj;k;f . . . dj;k;1Þ and
ðd0j;k;f . . . d0j;k;1Þ by using message extending and coding tech-
nique. Notice that tj;k ¼
Pf
l¼1ðdj;k;l þ d0j;k;lÞ.
After transformation, the outsourced function F used in
basic EPOC can be transformed into the new function F00 as
follows:
F00 : o ¼
XK
j¼1
Cj 
Yg
k¼1
Yf
l¼1
x
dj;k;l
k  x
d0
j;k;l
k
 !
:
It is worth noting that the final results calculated by F
and F00 are the same. The construction of full EPOC is simi-
lar to that of the enhanced EPOC. The difference is that
we use the outsourced function F00 instead of F in the
enhanced version (see Section 4.4.3).
Example 2. We use the following example to illustrate
the correctness of the full EPOC. Denote p0 ¼ 3
q0 ¼ 11; K ¼ 2; and f ¼ 3, compute p ¼ 2p0 þ 1 ¼ 7 and
q ¼ 2q0 þ 1 ¼ 23. Suppose given a public data ~a ¼
ða1; a2Þ ¼ ð2; 3Þ, the user wants to calculate the function
F : o ¼ a31. Before uploading the coefficients and
expoents, F must be transformed into F00 due to the
security concern. Firstly, one 0a01a
0
2 should pad to F such
that o ¼ a31a02 þ 0a01a02 ¼ a31a02þ a01a02  a01a02. After that, all
the exponent should be coded using message extending
and coding technique, i.e., 3 should be transformed into
two integers 2 and 1, and then coding them as
ð23;22;21Þ and ð22;21;20Þ respectively. The integer
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0 should be transformed into 1 and 1, and then coding
them as ð22; 21; 20Þ and ð22;21;20Þ respectively. We
can easily verified that ð23  22  21Þþ ð22  21  20Þ ¼
2þ 1 ¼ 3 and ð22 þ 21 þ 20Þ þ ð22  21  20Þ ¼ 1þ
1 ¼ 0. Finally, F 2 can be transformed into F00 : o0 ¼
a2
3
1 a
22
1 a
21
1 a
22
2 a
21
2 a
20
2 þ a2
2
1 a
21
1 a
20
1 a
22
2 a
21
2 a
20
2  a2
2
1 a
21
1 a
20
1
a2
2
2 a
21
2 a
20
2 : All the coefficients and exponents should be
encrypted as MUL ciphertext and send to PCP for calcu-
lation. The final output of F and F00 are the same, i.e.,
o0 ¼ o ¼ 8.
Remark 1. If the user only wants to get the top-K values
from the computed results, privacy-preserving top-K
protocol [14] can be used between PCP and PCC to select
K encrypted value from the t encrypted values. Only the
selected K encrypted values are needed to be sent back
to the user which can reduce both communication cost
and computational overhead.
Remark 2. In order to prevent a users privilege from
being abused, our private key revocation solution is
easy and simple: once the user needs to be revoked,
the PCC does not provide the AddPDec1 service to
the revoked user. As only holding the partial ADD
private key 2, the revoked user cannot decrypt the
encrypted final results.
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will analyze the security of SHED and
then show that our EPOCs meet the three privacy levels
defined in 3.2.
5.1 The Analysis of SHED
5.1.1 The Existence of Large Prime Number Selection
In the KeyGen algorithm, we need to select two large safe
prime numbers p0; q0, compute p ¼ 2p0 þ 1 and q ¼ 2q0 þ 1,
such that p  1mod 8 and q  1mod 8. We call a prime
number p0 a Sophie Germain prime if 2p0 þ 1 is also prime.
Here, our selection can be guaranteed by the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. Let p0  3mod 4 be prime. 2p0 þ 1 is also prime if
and only if 2p0 þ 1 dividesMp0 , whereMp0 is Mersenne prime.
Proof. The theorem was stated by Euler in 1750 and proved
by Lagrange in 1775. The proof can be found in [15]. tu
Notice if p0  3mod 4, then p  2p0 þ 1 ¼ 1mod 8. So we
can use the theorem 1 directly to select p0 and q0 which can
satisfy the prime constrictions in our KeyGen algorithm.
5.1.2 The Existence of ADD Private Key Splitting
Here, we show how to randomly separate the ADD private
key into two parts. Due to gcdð;N2Þ ¼ 1, thus 9 s, s.t.
s  0mod and s  1modN2 hold at the same time (thanks
to Chinese remainder theorem [16], s ¼  ð1 modN2Þ
modN2). Thus, we only need to randomly choose 1 and 2,
s.t., 1 þ 2 ¼ s.
5.1.3 Security of SHED
The security of our SHED can be guaranteed by the follow-
ing theorem.
Theorem 2. The SHED scheme is semantic secure under Deci-
sional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem [12].
Proof. The newly proposed SHED is based on a switchable
homomorphic encryption mechanism and the original
scheme is secure under the standard chosen-plaintext
attack (CPA) model which based on the Decisional Dif-
fie-Hellman (DDH) problem [12]. In order to support
partially decryption, ð2; 2Þ-secret sharing method will be
used to randomly separate skþ into two parts. Due to the
character of the Shamir secret sharing techniques [17], it
is hard for adversary to recover the original secret (the
ADD private key) even the adversary gets the one share
(the adversary can also select the share all by himself). tu
Next, we will show that our SHED can resist the follow-
ing four kinds of analyses.
Against Original Ciphertext Analysis: The orignial (Paillier)
ADD ciphertext EpkþðmÞ and (ElGamal) MUL ciphertext
EpkðmÞ are secure under the CPA model [18], [19]. Also,
the ciphertext Epkþ;pkðmÞ in SHE is also secure under the
CPA model [12].
Against Partially Decrypted Ciphertext Analysis: Given
CT ðmÞ ¼ r0N1ð1þmN1ÞmodN2 to adversary for analy-
sis, it is still hard for adversary to get m or 1 due to
the hardness of Partial Discrete Logarithm (PDL) prob-
lem [18].
Against Partially Decrypted Ciphertext Relevant Analysis:
Given CT ðmÞ ¼ r0N1ð1þmN1ÞmodN2 and CT 0ðmÞ ¼
r00N1ð1þmN1ÞmodN2 to adversary for analysis, it is still
hard for adversary to distinguish these two partially
decrypted ciphertexts. It is because that r0 and r00 are ran-
domly chosen from a same distribution (r0 and r00 are indis-
tinguishable) and both the ciphertexts are encrypted under
the same encryption function.
5.2 Security Model Definition
Here we recall the security model for securely realizing an
ideal functionality in the presence of non-colluding semi-
honest adversaries. For simplicity, we do it for the specific
scenario of our functionality, which involve three parties,
the message which need to be protected from the challenge
user (a.k.a. “DU”), and both PCP (a.k.a. “S1”) and PCC (a.k.
a.“S2”). We refer the reader to [20] for the general case
definitions.
Let P ¼ ðDU; S1; S2Þ be the set of all protocol parties. We
consider three kinds of adversaries (ADU ;AS1 ;AS2 ) that cor-
rupt DU; S1 and S2, respectively. In the real world, DU runs
on input x and y (with additional auxiliary inputs zx and zy),
while S1 and S2 receive auxiliary inputs z1 and z2. LetH 
 P
be the set of honest parties. Then, for every P 2 H, let outP
be the output of party P , whereas if P is corrupted, i.e.
P 2 PnH, then outP denotes the view of P during the proto-
colP.
For every P  2 P, the partial view of P  in a real-world
execution of protocol P in the presence of adversaries
A ¼ ðADU ;AS1 ;AS2Þ is defined as
REALP

P;A;H;zðx; yÞ ¼ foutP : P 2 Hg [ outP :
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In the ideal world, there is an ideal functionality f for a
function f and the parties interact only with f. Here, the
challenge user sends x and y to f. If any of x or y is ?, then f
returns ?. Finally, f returns fðx; yÞ to the challenge user. As
before, letH 
 P be the set of honest parties. Then, for every
P 2 H, let outP be the output returned by f to party P ,
whereas if P is corrupted, outP is the same value returned
by P .
For every P  2 P, the partial view of P  in an ideal-world
execution in the presence of independent simulators Sim=
(SimDU ;SimS1 ;SimS2 ) is defined as
IDEALP

f;Sim;H;zðx; yÞ ¼ foutP : P 2 Hg [ outP :
Informally, a protocol P is considered secure against
non-colluding semi-honest adversaries if it partially emulates,
in the real world, an execution of f in the ideal world. More
formally,
Definition 4. Let f be a deterministic functionality among parties
in P. Let H 
 P be the subset of honest parties in P. We say
that P securely realizes f if there exists a set Sim=
(SimDU ;SimS1 ;SimS2 ) of PPT transformations (where
SimD1 ¼ SimD1ðAD1Þ and so on) such that for all semi-hon-
est PPT adversaries A ¼ ðADU ;AS1 ;AS2Þ, for all inputs x, y
and auxiliary inputs z, and for all parties P 2 P it holds
fREALPP;A;H;zð; x; yÞg2N 
c fIDEALPf;Sim;H;zð; x; yÞg2N
where c denotes computational indistinguishability.
5.3 Security of SEPB
Theorem 3. The SEPB protocol is securely computes exponent
operation with private exponent in the presence of semi-honest
(non-colluding) adversaries A ¼ ðADU ;AS1 ;AS2Þ.
Proof. Here, we show how to construct the three indepen-
dent simulators SimDU ;SimS1 ;SimS2 .
SimDU receives y as input and then simulates ADU
as follows: it generates encryption Epka ðyÞ ¼MulEnc
ðpka ; yÞ of y. Finally, it returns Epka ðyÞ to ADU and out-
puts ADU ’s entire view. The view of ADU consists of the
encrypted data. The views of ADU in the real and the
ideal executions are indistinguishable due to the security
of MUL ciphertext [19].
SimS1 simulates AS1 as follows: First, it generates
(fake) encryptions of the inputs Epka ðyÞ by running
MulEnc on randomly chosen u^a;1, randomly generates
R^1; R^2 2 ZN , calculates X^01 and X^02. Then, SimS1 sends the
encryption X^01 and X^
0
2 to AS1 . If AS1 replies with ?, then
SimS1 returns ?. The view of AS1 consists of the
encrypted data it creates. In both the real and the ideal
execution, he receives the output the encryptions X^01 and
X^02. In the real world this is guaranteed by the fact that
the user is honest and the semantically security of SHED.
The views of AS1 in the real and the ideal executions are
indistinguishable.
SimS2 simulates AS2 as follows: it randomly chooses
h^1 and h^2, uses the MulEnc to get H^1 and H^2, and then
sends the encryption to AS2 . If AS2 replies with ?, then
SimS2 returns ?. The view of AS2 consists of the
encrypted data it creates. In both the real and the ideal
execution he receives the output the encryptions H^1 and
H^2. In the real world this is guaranteed by the fact that
the user is honest and the semantically security of SHED.
The views of AS2 in the real and the ideal executions are
indistinguishable. tu
5.4 Security of Basic EPOC
Here, we analyze that our basic EPOC can resist adversary
A described in Section 3.2 and achieve Level-I privacy.
If A eavesdrop the transmission link between the chal-
lenge user and PCP, the encrypted coefficients Epkþa ðCjÞ and
the final results Epkþa ðoiÞ are got by A
. Moreover, the inter-
mediated ciphertext Epkþa ðCja
tj;1
i;1 . . . a
tj;g
i;g Þ and Epkþa ðoiÞ trans-
mitted between PCP and PCC may also be eavesdropped
by A. Because all the data in the transmission link are
transmitted as encrypted form, it is impossible for A to
decrypt these ciphertexts without knowing the user’s ADD
private key due to IND-CPA secure of (Paillier) ADD
ciphertext [18]. Next, if PCP is compromised by A, A can
get all the ADD ciphertexts. Even holding the challenge
user’s partial ADD private key, A still cannot get all the
queries and final results due to the semantically security of
SHED. Moreover, suppose PCC is compromised by A, A
can get all the user’s ADD ciphertexts and their partial
MUL private keys (all the ADD & MUL private keys are
randomly separated). According to the security of SHED,
all the user’s final results cannot be decrypted by A even
getting the corresponding partial ADD private keys. Fur-
thermore, if A compromises some of the users to get some
user’s partial ADD private keys, he still cannot decrypt the
challenge user’s ADD ciphertexts. It is because different
user’s ADD private keys in our system are unrelated (all the
system ADD private keys in SHED are selected randomly
and independently, and partial ADD private keys are ran-
domly separated). Furthermore, even the A can know
which original data are accessed, the coefficients of the out-
sourced function and the final results can still be protected
due to the CPA-secure of the ADD ciphertext. In all, A can-
not know the challenge user’s sensitive information which
satisfies Level-I privacy which defined in Section 3.2.
5.5 Security of Enhanced EPOC
Here, we analyze that our enhanced EPOC can resist the
adversary A. The analysis is similar to that of basic EPOC
list in Section 5.4. The difference is that MPT technique are
used to transform all the exponents and coefficients of the
outsourced function into the data with the Jacobi symbol of
1, and then the transformed queries are encrypted under
the MUL public key before sending to PCP. More extra the
intermediate ciphertexts (X01; X
0
2; H1; H2 in SEPB) are also
transmitted between PCP and PCC in the enhanced EPOC.
Due to the semantically security of SHED, A cannot
decrypt any of the ADD ciphertexts and MUL ciphertexts
(IND-CPA secure of El-Gamal ciphertext [19]). Moreover,
even A get the user’s encrypted query, he cannot still
decrypt the results because PCP only hold the partial of the
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MUL private key (the whole MUL private key are randomly
divided by running KeyGen algorithm). Furthermore, the
adversary A can still get nothing from the decryption
results even he can partially decrypt to get the intermediate
results. Due to the security of SEPB protocol (see Section 5.3
for detailed analysis), some random numbers are used to
randomize each of the intermediate results. For the chal-
lenge user a, A cannot decrypt Epka ðCjÞ and Epka ðt0j;k;lÞ
without knowing domain a’s MUL private key (different
MUL private keys are unrelated and independence), and
cannot decrypt the final results Epkþa ðoiÞ without knowing
domain a’s ADD private key (different domain’s MUL
encrypted queries and ADD encrypted results are
encrypted under different modular N). In all, A cannot
know the challenge user’s sensitive information which satis-
fies Level-II privacy which defined in Section 3.2.
5.6 Security of Full EPOC
The security of full EPOC is similar to that of the
enhanced version. The difference is that MEC technique
are used to transform all the coefficients and exponents
into the message with the Jacobi symbol of 1. The infor-
mation of the MUL encrypted queries will not be leaked
to A. As all the data (dimensions) are used for calcula-
tion, it is impossible for A guess in which dimensions or
data the challenge user are interested. Moreover, all out-
sourced function have fix numbers of monomials (con-
stant-length, with some redundancy monomials added to
the original function), it is hard for A to guess the format
of the outsourced function. In all, A cannot know the
challenge user’s sensitive information which satisfies
Level-III privacy which defined in Section 3.2.
6 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the three ver-
sions of EPOC in terms of both the computation cost and
the communication overhead.
6.1 Experimental Analysis
In this section, we evaluate computation cost and communi-
cation overhead of the proposed EPOC by using a custom
simulator built in Java. The experiment is run on a PC with
3.6 GHz eight-core processors and 12 GBmemory. Both syn-
thetic dataset and real dataset will be used to test the perfor-
mance of EPOC.
6.1.1 Synthetic Dataset
We use synthetic dataset which is randomly generated to
test the three versions of our EPOC. This dataset contains
500 tuples. Each tuple contains 10 attributes. Each attribute
of tuple is randomly picked from 1 to 5,000. There are four
factors which affect the total running time of the EPOC: i)
the number of monomials contained in the outsourced func-
tions (NNF); ii) the number of tuples in the synthetic dataset
(NUM); iii) the dimension of the vector existed in the data-
set (DIM); iv) the maximum length of the vector expansion
in the message pre-coding technique (MLV).
We first test the performance of SHED scheme and SEPB
protocol, and list the results in Tables 2 and 3 respectively.
We denote N as 1,024 bits in SHED cryptosystem to achieve
80-bit security levels [21]. Then, we plot both the computa-
tion cost and communication overhead which vary with
NNF in Fig. 2. Because more queries (coefficients of the func-
tion and the exponent of every monomials of the function)
are encrypted and sent to PCP for computation, both the
computation cost and communication overhead in user’s
side and server’s side are increase with the NNF in the basic
and enhanced EPOC. The enhanced EPOC is much more
costly than the basic EPOC. Because SEPB protocol in the
enhanced EPOC is called while no sub-protocol are called in
the basic EPOC. Furthermore, the full EPOC is not vary with
NNF because fix number of monomials are involved in this
kind of EPOC. In Fig. 3, we plot both the computation cost
and communication overhead which vary with NUM. From
the figure we can see that both the computation cost and
communication overhead in user’s side and server’s side are
increased with the NUM in these three EPOC. It is because
more tuples will be processed in PCP and more encrypted
results will be transmitted back to user. In Fig. 4, we plot
both the computation cost and communication overhead
which vary with DIM. From the figure we can see that the
computation cost and communication overhead over the
user side of the enhanced EPOC are increased with DIM
while the basic EPOC is not changed much with DIM. It is
because more SEPB are needed in the enhanced EPOCwhile
only some exponential calculation over plaintext are
involved in the basic EPOC. Moreover, some fix numbers of
dimensions are involved in the full EPOC such that the full
EPOC is free from DIM. In Fig. 5, we plot both the computa-
tion cost and communication overhead which vary with
MLV. The basic EPOC is free from MLV because no expan-
sion are needed in the base version. Both the enhanced and
full EPOC are increasedwithMLV.
6.1.2 Real Dataset
Before using real dataset to test the efficiency of the EPOC,
we first choose a baseline for comparison: do function
TABLE 2
The Performance of SHED Cryptosystem (1,000-Times for Average, 80-Bits Security Level)
Algorithm AddEnc MulEnc AddPDec1 AddPDec2 AddDec MulDec AddToMix MulToMix MixToAdd
Time 7.865 ms 10.122 ms 23.156 ms 22.864 ms 8.209 ms 2.801 ms 10.861 ms 12.459 ms 20.128 ms
TABLE 3
The Performance of Algorithm & Sub-Protocol (1,000-Times
for Average, 80-Bits Security Level)
PCP compute. PCC compute. Commu.
MixToAdd (SHED) 8.973 ms 11.199 ms 0.874 KB
SEPB 11.791 ms 12.075 ms 1.497 KB
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calculation over public database without any privacy pro-
tection technique, i.e., the user sends the function to PCP for
calculation without any protection, and the calculated
results are directly sent back to the user after calculation.
Next, we use the ISTANBUL STOCK EXCHANGE Data Set
from UCI Machine Learning Repository [22] as the real
dataset to test the performance of EPOC. There are 536
tuples includes returns of Istanbul Stock Exchange with
seven other international indexs [including S&P 500 Index
(New York Stock Exchange); Deutscher Aktien Index
(Frankfurt Stock Exchange); FTSE 100 Index (London Stock
Exchange); Nikkei Index (Tokyo Stock Exchange); Bovespa
Index (Brasil Sao Paulo Stock Exchange); MSCI Europe
Index; MSCI Emerging Markets Index] from Jun 5, 2009 to
Feb 22, 2011. We use the seven attributes to test the effi-
ciency of EPOC. Because SHED can only encrypt positive
integers, all the attributes in the dataset should be
normalized into integer before running EPOC. The trans-
formed dataset should be used to test both the computation
cost and communication overhead of between the baseline
and different EPOC. After that, we list all the comparison
results in Table 4. No encryption is needed which cost no
computational resource in user’s side for the baseline while
only the function’s coefficients are needed to be encrypted
and sent to the PCP in the user side of the basic EPOC. The
ciphertext homomorphic calculation in basic version con-
sumes more computational resource than the directly plain-
text computation in baseline. In the enhanced EPOC, both
the coefficients and the encrypted exponent ti;k of a mono-
mials independent variable are coded and encrypted by
user, and then sent to PCP which involves more computa-
tion cost to the user. More computation and communication
resources are needed between PCP and PCC due to the
necessity of executing SEPB. In the full version of EPOC, all
Fig. 3. Experiment analysis vary with NUM in the synthetic dataset
(NNF = 2, DIM = 2, f ¼ 5).
Fig. 2. Experiment analysis vary with NNF in the synthetic dataset
(NUM = 100, DIM = 2, f ¼ 5). Fig. 4. Experiment analysis vary with DIM in the synthetic dataset(NUM = 100, NNF = 2, f ¼ 5).
Fig. 5. Experiment analysis vary with MLV in the synthetic dataset
(NUM = 100, NNF = 2, DIM = 2).
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the dimensions will be used in the calculation that involves
more computation cost and communication overhead.
Moreover, because some redundancy monomials are used
for calculation, more SEPB and multiplications are involved
which introduced more computational cost and communi-
cation overhead.
6.2 Theoretical Analysis
6.2.1 Computational Cost
In SHED scheme, let us assume that one regular exponentia-
tion operation with an exponent of length jN j requires
1:5jNj multiplications [23], e.g, the length of  is jN j and
compute g requires 1:5jNjmultiplications. The length of 1
and 2 are 3jN j and compute g1 or g2 requires 4:5jNj mul-
tiplications. Due to exponentiation operation is much costly
than the addition and multiplication operation, we ignore
some fix numbers of addition and multiplication operations
in our analysis. For SHED, it costs 1:5jNj multiplications to
use AddEnc, AddDec and MulDec algorithm. Moreover, it
needs 3jN j multiplications to run MulEnc algorithm.
Furthermore, AddToMix, MulToMix, AddPDec1 and
AddPDec2 algorithm needs 4:5jNj multiplications while
MulToMix needs 7:5jNj multiplications. Finally, it costs
9jNj multiplications to run MixToAdd. For the basic sub-
protocols, it costs 18jNj multiplications by executing the
SEPB protocol. In basic EPOC, it costs the user OðkjN jÞmul-
tiplications to encrypted all the coefficients Cj, costs
OðktjNjÞ multiplications in Stage One, costs Oðtðkþ jN jÞÞ
multiplications in Stage Two, and costs the user OðtjNjÞ
multiplications to decrypt all the final results. In enhanced
EPOC, it costs the user OðkjNjÞmultiplications to encrypted
all the coefficients Cj and costs OðkgfjN jÞmultiplications to
encrypt exponent of all monomials. In all, it costs OðkgfjNjÞ
multiplications in Stage One, costs Oðktðg þ jN jÞÞ multipli-
cations in Stage Two, and costs the user OðtjN jÞ multiplica-
tions to decrypt all the final results. In full EPOC, it costs the
user OðKjNjÞ multiplications to encrypted all the coeffi-
cients Cj and costs OðKgfjN jÞ multiplications to encrypt
exponent of all monomials. In all, it costs OðKgfjNjÞ
multiplications in Stage One, costs OðKtðg þ jN jÞÞ
multiplications in Stage Two, and costs the user OðtjNjÞ
multiplications to decrypt all the final results.
6.2.2 Communication Overhead
In this section, we compare the communication overhead
about these three versions of EPOC. In SHED scheme, each
ADD ciphertext EpkþðxÞ needs 2jN j bits to represent while
MUL ciphertext EpkðxÞ ¼ fC1; C2g needs 2jN j bits to trans-
mit (C1 andC2 needs jN j bits for storage, respectively). In the
basic EPOC, the user needs to send all the encrypted coeffi-
cientsEpkþðCjÞ to PCPwhich takesOðkjNjÞ bits to communi-
cate in Stage One. Moreover, all the partially decrypted
results should be sent back to the user which takes OðtjNjÞ
bits to transmit in Stage Two. So it costs Oððkþ tÞjN jÞ bits
(one round between PCP and the user6) to transmit all the
encrypted data in the transmission link in basic EPOC. In the
enhanced EPOC, the user needs to send all the encrypted
coefficients Epka ðCjÞ and the exponent of monomials
Epka ðt0j;k;lÞ to PCP which takes OðkgfjNjÞ bits to communi-
cate. Also, it takesOðkgtfjN jÞ bits by executing Stage One of
the enhanced EPOC (3jNj bits for executing SEPB for one
time). In Stage Two, all the partially decrypted results cost
OðtjN jÞ bits to transmit. So it costs OðkgtfjN jÞ bits (one
round between PCP and the user, OðktgfÞ rounds between
PCP and PCC) to transmit all the encrypted data in the trans-
mission link. The full EPOC is similar to that of the enhance
EPOC which costs OðKgfjNjÞ bits between the user and
PCP while costs OðKgtfjNjÞ bits between PCP and PCC
(one round between PCP and the user, OðKtgfÞ rounds
between PCP and PCC). Both the computational and com-
munication comparison results are shown in Table 5.
7 RELATED WORK
More and more data are generated and outsourced to cloud
servers for storage with the development of cloud computing.
However, the cloud server is a third-party server. One of the
momentous problems in cloud computing is how to perform
TABLE 4
Experiment over Real Dataset (NUM = 536, DIM = 3, k ¼ 3, K = 10, f ¼ 5, 80-Bit Security Level)
Computation
(user)
Computation
(server)
Communication
(user & PCP)
Communication
(PCC & PCP)
Baseline N.A. 0.283 s 71.922 KB 70.347 KB
Basic EPOC 12.386 s 13.126 s 535.771 KB 133.842 KB
Enhanced EPOC 12.631 s 10.943 min 674.772 KB 41.352 MB
Full EPOC 13.028 s 93.748 min 1.585 MB 386.051 MB
TABLE 5
Theoretical Analysis of EPOC
EPOC T. Comput.
(/mul)
T. Commun.
(/bits)
User Comput.
(/mul)
User & PCP
Commu.(/mul)
User & PCP PCP & PCC
Basic OðktjN jÞ Oððkþ tÞjNjÞ Oððkþ tÞjN jÞ Oððkþ tÞjN jÞ One Round One Round
Enhanced OðkgtfjN jÞ OðkgtfjN jÞ OððKgfþ tÞjN jÞ Oððkgfþ tÞjN jÞ One Round OðkgtfÞ Rounds
Full OðKgtfjN jÞ OðKgtjN jÞ OððKgfþ tÞjN jÞ OððKgfþ tÞjN jÞ One Round OðKgtfÞ Rounds
6. For a resource limited user, one round communication between
the user and the server is optimal.
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computation over encrypted data. Homomorphic encryption
is the holy grail of the cryptography which allows computa-
tions to be carried out on ciphertext which reflect on some
operations over the plaintext. Additive homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme allows a third party to do some operations over
the ciphertext which reflect on some additive calculations
over the plaintext (e.g. Paillier cryptosystem [18], Benaloh
cryptosystem [24]) Moreover, multiplicative homomorphic
encryption permits users to do some operations over the
ciphertext which reflect on some multiplication calculations
over the plaintext (e.g. Unpadded RSA cryptosystem [25],
ElGamal cryptosystem [19]). Many protocols [26], [27] and
applications [28], [29] are proposed using these two kinds of
homomorphic cryptosystems. However, it has been still a
tricky problem to achieve both addition and multiplication in
plaintext by calculation over the ciphertexts under one crypto-
system. A cryptosystem that supports arbitrary computations
on ciphertexts is known as fully homomorphic encryption
(FHE) and is far more powerful. The first fully homomorphic
encryption scheme is constructed by Gentry [30] based on lat-
tice-based cryptography which supports both addition and
multiplication operations on ciphertexts, followed by many
other efforts on fully homomorphic cryptosystems [31], [32].
However, fully homomorphic cryptography is still not effi-
cient enough to be implemented on real systems [33], [34].
Recently, Lim et al. [12] show a switchable homomorphic
encryptionwhich can transform a ciphertext between additive
homomorphic cryptosystem and multiplicative homomor-
phic cryptosystem. A limitation of the scheme is that it can
only encryptmessageswith Jacobi symbol 1 to be secure.
The Partial Homomorphic Cryptosystem (additive
homomorphic OR multiplicative homomorphic) is much
more efficient for secure outsourced storage [35], [36] and
computation [37]. Samanthula et. al. [38] propose an effi-
cient and Secure Data Sharing (SDS) framework using
homomorphic encryption prevents the leakage of unau-
thorized data when a revoked user rejoins the system.
Popa et. al. [39] design a system called CryptDB which
aims to protect data confidentiality against threats by exe-
cuting SQL (Structured Query Language) queries (such
as, sum, equality, additions, etc.) over encrypted data in a
privacy-preserving way. Stephen et. al. [40] present a sys-
tem called Crypsis that allows execution of mapreduce-
style data analysis jobs directly on encrypted big data.
Tang et. al. [41] focus on authenticated data-outsourcing
problem specifically for continuous updating the multi-
version key-value data. Moreover, a lots of protocol are
designed for some specific functionality over the out-
sourced encrypted data, such as: secure outsourced
sequence comparison protocol [42], [43], secure out-
sourced k-means protocol [27], [44], secure outsourced set
intersection protocol [45]. All the above the systems focus
on protecting confidential of data rather than the compu-
tation procedure, i.e., all data are protected using encryp-
tion technique before outsourcing, the calculating
algorithm/function are known to the cloud (curious cloud
may know your are interested add/k-means calculation).
Different from the above models, the new privacy issues
are occurred when meet with the public dataset: protect
the computation procedure and its calculated outputs
with public inputs. A new system should be designed for
protecting the outsourced computation procedure and cal-
culated results against a curious servers.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new and efficient framework for
privacy-preserving outsourced functional computation over
public data (EPOC). EPOC enables user to efficiently out-
source the computation of a function to the cloud without
compromising the privacy of the user’s function and its out-
put. As key components of EPOC, a new public key crypto-
system presented to support partially decryption, and a
new Secure Exponent Calculation Protocol with Public Base
is designed. In addition, through extensive performance
evaluation, we demonstrate that our EPOC can balance the
computation-intensive functional computation and user’s
privacy protection at different levels. As future work, we
will study EPOC which provides verifiability of the out-
sourced computation over public databases.
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